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Abstract 
This paper investigates volatility spillovers transmission amongst selected companies 
within the STOXX Europe Diversification Select 50 Index and thereby highlighted 
systemically important companies that might transfer risk to other firms within a similar 
sector in the event of substantial external shock. Further, the study assessed the effects 
of innovation and foreign direct investment on systemic risk. The invariant forecast error 
variance decompositions for total and directional volatility spillovers by Diebold and 
Yilmaz (2012) and ΔCoVaR by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016) were adopted as the 
spillover and systemic risk measure respectively. 
 
Our results show high volatility amongst some companies; however, volatility levels do 
not seem to correlate with spillover transmission. We also find a negative relationship 
between innovation and systemic risk. However, for the variables representing FDI, we 
find that foreign control decreases systemic risk, while firms with foreign subsidiaries 
increased systemic risk contribution. 
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1. Introduction 
Over the past two decades, there have been several global level shocks arising from 
different adverse situations with palpable effects on both financial markets and the real 
economy. Noticeable amongst them are the global financial crisis, the Chinese market 
turbulence, Brexit, the Greek government-debt crisis, and the early onslaught of the 
Covid-19 pandemic. An undeniable characteristic of these shocks is that it usually starts 
from one country, but its effects gradually spread across the globe over a period of time. 
Globalization and financial integration are important factors contributing to the spurt of 
such shocks across the world ( Bruno and Shin ( 2015), Moshirian (2015)).  
 
Although advancements made toward globalization have resulted in several advantages 
including international trade, transfer of investment from one part of the globe to another 
as well as promoting industrialization. Its affinity towards internationalization makes it 
a perfect channel for the transmission of systemic risk (Van Cauwenberge, Vancauteren, 
Braekers, and Vandemaele, 2019).  
 
The intensity and concentration of each crisis may be unique, however, the reaction from 
policy advisors and governments targeted at ameliorating the negative economic impacts 
have largely been monotonous. Bailouts, stimulus packages, and enhanced regulatory 
frameworks have been the preferred tools in this regard. For instance, during the global 
financial crisis, it is estimated that the United States government made commitments of 
about US$16.8 trillion (Collins, 2015) in addition to regulatory reforms such as the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. Currently, a US$2 trillion 
stimulus package has been earmarked for the ongoing health pandemic (Covid-19). 
Similar interventions have been introduced by governments around the world.  
 
Often, the ensuing debate after the implementation of these strategies focuses on whether 
these measures constitute an efficient use of public funds and why the signs of an 
imminent crisis were not noticed and examined in time. Certainly, a more proactive 
approach could be properly tailored regulation in response to systemically important 
firms irrespective of their sector of operation because of their potential to 
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negatively impact the stability of other firms and even the entire economy depending on 
the magnitude of spillovers emitted.  
 
Considering a different context, the European Central Bank (ECB) introduced 
interventions at the end of the third quarter of 2019 to help stimulate growth within the 
economy of the Eurozone. The aggressive nature of these measures was as a result of 
consistently low inflation levels and slow growth rates experienced in the Eurozone. The 
situation was projected to worsen due to the USA-China trade war, Brexit, and the 
slowdown of the Chinese economy, therefore, affirming the possibility of spillover 
transmission and systemic risk from different situations. 
 
These considerations make the study of systemic risk and spillover transmission 
imperative. A scan through literature shows more studies have been carried out on the 
financial sector probably because most devastating crisis’ are related to the financial 
sector (Rossi and Malavasi (2016), Acharya Philippon, Richardson, and Roubini (2009)), 
even though firms in both the financial and non-financial sectors have the potential to 
influence systemic risk (Van Cauwenberge et al., 2019). The effects of crises on the real 
sectors of the economy can be equally devastating. Initially, individual consumers defer 
spending on durable goods while businesses shun capital investments, this strategy 
results in declining sales and price reductions within both local and international markets 
(Eaton, Kortum, Neiman, and Romalis (2016), Bems, Johnson and Yi (2013)) which then 
culminates into job losses and even economic recessions.  
 
Accordingly, this research seeks to identify systemically important companies by 
evaluating the volume of volatility spillover received and transmitted and also ascertain 
the effects of innovation and FDI on systemic risk amongst blue-chip companies in the 
STOXX Europe Diversification Select 50 Index. A common characteristic of blue-chip 
companies is that they lend themselves to innovation and internationalization which are 
components of the OLI framework (Dunning, 1979) used to explain why companies seek 
new markets. It will be interesting to find their impacts on systemic risk.  
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This study adopts the definition of systemic risk proposed by Adrian and Brunnermeier 
(2016). It simply denotes the risk that an entire system’s (industry or even economy) 
capacity becomes compromised or unstable as a result of activities at the individual firm 
level. In this case, the impaired state of the system could be caused by global shocks that 
increase the potential to transmit high volatility spillovers to other firms in the sector and 
thereby trigger systemic risk incidents. By extension, we define systemically important 
firms as firms with high positive net volatility spillovers. 
 
The rest of this research is constituted into five additional sections: Section 2 reviews 
literature about financial spillovers and systemic risk, Section 3 describes the data and 
data sources used, Section 4 elaborates on the selected methodology for the study, 
Section 5 provides a summary of empirical results and findings, and Section 6 highlights 
conclusions and recommendations from the research.  
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2. Literature Review 
2.1 Financial Spillover  
In the time of crisis, the interdependence between various financial markets is highly 
discussed among investors, academics, and regulatory authorities. There are several 
reasons for this interest. First, the possibility of diversifying risk depends on the degree 
of interactions between these markets. Second, if there is a causal relationship between 
the returns from different aspects of the financial market, investors can exploit 
investment strategies to obtain benefits in periods of high uncertainty. Third, knowledge 
about the connections between markets is useful in optimizing portfolios and asset 
pricing. Finally, it also helps financial authorities control contagion between markets by 
implementing effective regulations to stabilize the financial system and capital flows. 
 
Financial crises frequently transcend its epicenter due to the existence of channels that 
allow vulnerability transmission. The nature of spillover effects observed could be 
considered as a warning post for a possible crisis that manifests itself through signals 
emitted by the market such as the direction of capital flows, drop in share indexes, 
depreciation of the national currency, etc. Generally, spillovers connote events, policies, 
or a phenomenon that occurs in a country, sector, firms, stock market, or any similar 
entity that impacts the structure of other entities. The spillover effect as it is known has 
become relevant as a result of the increasing integration of the markets, financial 
institutions, factors such as deregulation, globalization, and the advances in information 
technology. 
 
Evidence indicates that information plays a critical role in most markets and these 
markets continue to strive for integration. Advantages attained from integration are well 
known (Kose et al., (2009), Prasad et al., (2010)). For instance, investors have the 
freedom to allocate their risk in a more efficient way which reduces the cost of capital of 
firms. However, studying the consequences from the recent financial crisis, some authors  
(Mendoza et al. (2009), (2010); Caballero et al. (2008); Milesi-Ferretti and Tille (2011) 
Cetorelli and Goldberg, (2012); Bruno and Shin (2015); Moshirian (2015)) found that 
the integration of markets with some retrenchment in capital inflows intensified 
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contagion effect causing a severe loss to the global economy, enormous collapse in 
international trade, and a reduction in capital flow to and from advanced economies. 
 
There is vast literature on volatility spillovers across developed markets  ( Beirne and 
Fratzscher, (2013), Beirne et al., (2013), Cho et al., (2015), Diebold and Yilmaz (2009) 
(2012), Singh et al., (2010), Syriopoulos (2007), Worthington and Higgs (2004)) show 
that countries usually experience significant spillover effects when there is a slowdown 
in the biggest economies within the integrated system, for example, the USA or China. 
These examples are often useful in understanding contagion, stock market integration, 
and the possible role of some countries or regions as sources of systemic shock.  
 
The global financial crisis of 2008/2009 confirmed the importance of measuring 
contagious effects, especially for highly connected economies. The shocks from stock 
market downturns in the United States spread rapidly across the globe and impacted 
distinct economies at different levels. Apostolakis and Papadopoulos (2014) examined 
the financial stress co-movements and the results showed a positive relationship between 
crisis periods and uncertainty, with the USA being the principal transmitter of the 
financial stress spillovers through financial markets during stressful periods. To have a 
holistic discussion concerning global financial interconnectedness, it is important to 
know the volatility spillovers within different regions as it helps provide better 
appreciation of the channels of intra-regional and inter-regional transmission of volatility 
spillover across developed countries and emerging markets such as Asia, Latin-
American, Europe and Africa (Yarovaya, Brzeszczyński, Lau, and Keung, 2016). 
 
More so, increasing economic integration of emerging markets during the last two 
decades - with the help of globalization and new technologies - has many implications 
for the rest of the world. According to Huidrom et al., (2016) the key channels for 
transmitting spillovers from emerging markets are usually through its increasing share in 
global economic activity, global trade, and financial linkages. On average, the 
fluctuations in asset prices from major emerging markets such as Brazil, China, India, 
and South Africa to equity prices and exchange rates of other economies have increased 
by 28% (Gelos & Surti, 2016). Apostolou, Beirne, and John (2019) opined that changes 
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in the monetary policies of the Federal Reserve (FED) and European Central Bank (ECB) 
had impacts on emerging economies in terms of market volatilities since the financial 
crisis. 
 
In recent times, the European financial market has reacted to uncertainty over Brexit, and 
countries within the region have been affected. Nishimura and Sun (2018) adopted a new 
approach by using intraday data to examine the spillover effect in most important 
European markets. The results of this study reveal that the spillover effects increase in 
the first month after the vote but diminished afterward. Also, the dynamics of volatility 
spillovers from Credit Default Swaps (CDSs) around the Brexit pronouncement show 
that there was an increase with respect to previous prices and undermine creditworthiness 
in both the UK and Europe (Bouoiyour and Selmi, 2018). From this, it was concluded 
that the UK is a net transmitter of volatility while countries like France and Germany that 
are more likely to be “stress receivers”. 
 
Li, Ahmedy, and Chevapatraku (2016) analyzed four of the most important European 
financial markets to uncover the characteristics of volatility spillovers and the 
interdependence among them. The authors made use of four types of measures: total 
(non-directional) spillovers, gross directional spillovers, net directional spillovers, and 
net pairwise spillovers. They employed the measure designed by Diebold and Yilmaz 
(2012) based on a generalized vector autoregression (VAR). The results highlight 
considerable interdependence between these markets where Germany and France before 
the Brexit referendum were found the net volatilities transmitters to others but after the 
referendum, France and the United Kingdom appear to be net transmitters of volatilities 
spillovers to Germany and Switzerland. 
 
2.2 Relationship Between Financial Spillovers and Systemic risk 
Recent investigations into risk within financial systems are beginning to unravel the 
relationships between financial connectedness or spillover effects and systemic risk. 
Systemic risk thrives on the integration and connectedness of markets (Diebold and 
Yilmaz, 2014). Let us focus on our choice of systemic risk measure ΔCoVaR, similar to 
aggregated spillover transmissions from a company to a sector, ΔCoVaR also captures 
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effects or systemic risk contributions from an entity to the entire system. Both measures 
gauge risk contributions from an individual entity to the overall risk of a system. The 
various spillover measures as well as systemic risk measure have been explained in detail 
under the methodology section of this research. 
Several studies have been done to measure systemic risk within the financial sector.  
Billio et al., (2012) presents one of the first studies conducted to capture casual 
relationships across some of the largest financial institutions including the connectedness 
between hedge funds, banks, broker/dealers and insurance companies using econometric 
measures such as principal component analysis and Granger-causality networks on 
monthly return data.  
 
Their approach was to measure Granger-causality among sectors that have diversified 
their portfolios by moving into non-core activities thereby increasing the potential to 
influence systemic risk. The study focuses more on direct and unconditional measures of 
connectedness to detect new links within the financial system. This is something lacking 
in conditional loss probability measures like COVAR and SES, which in non-crisis 
periods play a modest role in systemic risk buildup. Granger-causality includes this 
missing conditional loss probability since it uses predicted future values.  
 
The results show that in both of the sample periods October 2002-September 2005 and 
July 2004–June 2007, Granger-causality and principal components analysis seem to be 
predictive of the Financial Crisis of 2007–2009. Also, the results suggest that the banking 
and insurance sectors could be a more important source of spillovers to other financial 
institutions rather than brokers/dealers and hedge funds. This is consistent with evidence 
from the recent financial crisis. Although banks play the main role in transmitting shocks 
in comparison with other financial institutions, all four sectors selected for the study have 
become highly interrelated over the past decade and thereby impact the level of systemic 
risk in financial industries. 
 
In the case of Europe, some studies quantify systemic risk exposures within the financial 
sector. Andries, Nistor and Sprincean (2017) analyze the influence of Central Bank 
transparency on systemic risk for 34 banks operating on 9 Central and Eastern Europe 
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(CEE) countries, employing CoVaR and SRISK measures. The results revealed that high 
transparency from Central Banks, guide commercial banks to individually improve their 
expectations and decisions thereby decreasing their idiosyncratic risk. However, this 
transparency can also be harmful to the system from a macroprudential perspective. This 
is because individual financial institutions can increase their contribution to the risk of 
the banking system while engaging in risky activities. For emerging markets like the 
CEE, the spread of contagion spillover through the system will most likely depend on 
the degree of interconnectedness within interbank markets and how many of them are 
controlled by large international groups.  
 
Similarly, Karimalis and Nomikos (2018) use CoVaR as well, but with a new 
methodology. They use Copula CoVaR and CoES for 46 large European Banks as a 
representation of the European financial system, finding that banks from Spain and 
France contribute the most to systemic risk. The asymmetric behavior during the pre-
crisis period and afterwards seem to be connected to the harmonized intervention of 
central banks in response to the financial crisis. Also, the major determinants with the 
greatest impact on systemic risk are size and leverage, which means that bigger and/or 
highly leveraged financial institutions contribute to the increase of systemic risk in the 
economy in comparison to smaller less leveraged banks.  
 
Buch, Krause and Tonzer (2019) investigate whether there is a difference in the marginal 
contribution of the banking system to systemic risk by assessing whether banks adopt 
measures dictated from the European Central Bank (ECB) or measures from their 
respective national central banks. Their results show that banks with cross border 
externality have a higher contribution to systemic risk in the Euro area compared to the 
national level. In other words, banks with higher regional interconnectedness tend to 
contribute more to systemic risk. 
 
There are not enough empirical studies on systemic risk transmission in the non-financial 
sector. Some studies addressing this topic have recently emerged. For instance, Van 
Cauwenberge et al., (2018) consider stock data of 67 publicly listed Dutch companies, 
using ΔCoVaR suggested by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016) capturing the marginal 
9 
 
contribution of individual firms to overall systemic risk. To examine the impact of 
globalization, the authors conducted panel data analysis which measured three variables:  
firm trade intensity, the existence (or not) of foreign subsidiaries, and the presence (or 
not) of foreign control. The findings suggest that firms within the financial sector recover 
quickly from the effects of crisis in comparison with non-financial firms (Trapp and 
Wewell 2013) a reason why the non-financial sector deserves extra attention. Regarding 
the link between globalization and systemic risk, we find that foreign direct investment 
increases contribution to systemic risk spread. The result also highlights the importance 
of considering the effect of globalization not only on all sectors. 
 
With a different objective, Dungey et al., (2015) investigate the degree of systemic risk 
amongst different sectors in Australia before, during, and after the Global Financial 
Crisis by calculating a daily index of systemic risk from 2004 to 2013. The results 
demonstrate that the financial sector is the most consistently systemically risky sector, 
but there have been periods since 2008 where the mining sector has contributed to 
equivalent levels of systemic risk or even exceed the financial sector firms when 
combining the risk of all mining sector firms.  
 
A more specific study made by Kerste et al., (2015) highlighted the contagion risk within 
the energy sector and from the energy sector towards the banking sector which can be 
compared to other non-financial sectors. They made special emphasis on systemic risk 
in Over The Counter (OTC) derivative trading, which are private contracts traded 
between two parties without going through an exchange or other intermediaries. OTC 
derivatives could be negotiated and customized to suit the exact risk and return needed 
by each party. Although this type of derivative offers flexibility, it carries credit risk. For 
this reason, strict regulations are needed for these kinds of contracts, which are highly 
used within the non-financial sector (for instance, the energy sector) and the banking 
sector as highlighted in this study.  
 
Wu (2018) found similar results from the energy sector by analyzing Marginal Expected 
Shortfall (MES) and Component Expected Shortfall (CES) using post 2008 financial 
crisis data for the Chinese Market. The results based on MES found that the information 
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technology sector contributes the most to systemic risk. However, the CES analysis 
presents different results. It showed that the financial sector is the most important sector 
for systemic risk, followed by the industrial sector and energy sector. This again indicate 
the need to pay more attention to sectoral contributions to systemic risk and impose 
specific regulations to effectively monitor risk or contagion. 
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3. Data 
The study focuses on companies within the STOXX Europe Diversification Select 50 
EUR Index. The firms within the Select 50 index better suits our purpose since it is a 
condensed version of the comprehensive STOXX Europe 600 Index which contains 600 
high performing companies across over 18 countries in the Euro area (including Finland, 
Switzerland, France, Spain, Netherlands, Germany, Denmark, Italy, Belgium, Austria, 
Sweden, Great Britain, Norway, and Portugal).  
 
The index is controlled for correlated and volatile stocks before the top 50 companies in 
terms of dividend yield are selected to make up the index. Another advantage of using 
the index is that the companies therein are not concentrated in a few sectors of the 
economy but are rather spread across 13 essential sectors.  
 
However, due to data inconsistencies, the study was restricted to a sample of 37 
companies for volatility spillover analysis and 33 companies for the systemic risk 
analysis. Consequently, share prices of the selected companies for the period spanning 
January 01, 2010, and December 31, 2018, were retrieved from the Yahoo Finance 
website. The iShares Core Euro STOXX 50 UCITS ETF a different index was employed 
as a representation of the system in order to avoid overemphasizing potential 
relationships in estimating systemic risk measures. The index serving as a proxy is also 
controlled for sectorial concentration. 
 
For the time horizon analysed, there are about four main shocks that had palpable effects 
on stock markets across the globe and therefore are expected to be visible in time series 
plots of the systemic risk and spillover measures. These shocks include the aftermath of 
the Global Financial Crisis, the Greek currency crisis, Chinese Market Turbulence 
(August 2015), and Brexit (June 2016). 
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Figure 1: Plot of Price (STOXX Europe Diversification Select 50 EUR Index)  
 
Source: www.stoxx.com/index-details?symbol=SXXDSGR 
 
In addition to the above, firm characteristics obtained from the Amadeus Database and 
regional variables (including 3-month spot yield rate, 1-year forward rate, 5-year forward 
rate, 10-year forward rate, and credit spread) were used for the computation of the chosen 
systemic risk measure and other idiosyncratic metrics required for further analysis. 
Access to credit and the price thereof are important to systemic risk transmission as seen 
in Karimalis and Nomikos (2018) as well as the real sector, the focus of this research.  
 
In the case of panel data sources, annual firm characteristics retrieved from the Amadeus 
Database which includes total current assets, total liabilities, common equity, 
shareholding structure, spending on research as well as information on ownership and 
subsidiaries were added to the calculated systemic risk measure and other relevant 
metrics. 
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4. Methodology 
4.1 Calculation of Stock Returns and Volatility 
Financial return is described as a percentage expressing the difference in prices between 
two consecutive periods as a ratio of the earlier price. Often, studies into financial returns 
(for instance see Politi, Millot, and Chakraborti (2012), Han (2019), Pernagallo and 
Torrisi, (2019)) select the log-return definition out of the assorted formulae for financial 
return because of its unique characteristics which are amenable to statistical estimations. 
These characteristics according to Fryzlewicz (2005) include the log-return series 
exhibiting clustered volatility, having a sample mean approaching zero, approximately 
symmetric marginal distribution with heavy tails and a maximum value of zero, as well 
as insignificant sample autocorrelations of the series for nearly all lags but sample 
autocorrelations derived from absolute values and squares of the series remain large for 
the majority of lags. 
 
These characteristics go beyond the stationary requirement needed to take care of 
seasonal and deterministic trends found in time-series data such as stock prices. As a 
result, this study also adopts the log-returns definition as exhibited below. Here, Pt and 
Pt-1 represent the current period’s closing price and the preceding period’s closing price, 
respectively. 
𝑟𝑡 = 𝑙𝑛 (
𝑃𝑡
𝑃𝑡−1
) 
 
For volatility, the study modifies Garman and Klass (1980) “best analytic scale invariant 
estimator” as a proxy because of the challenges involved in calculating volatility directly.  
?̃?𝑖𝑡
2 = 0.511(𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐻𝑖𝑡 − 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐿𝑖𝑡)
2
− 0.019[(𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐶𝑖𝑡 − 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑂𝑖𝑡)(𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐻𝑖𝑡 + 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐿𝑖𝑡 − 2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑂𝑖𝑡) − 2(𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐻𝑖𝑡
− 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑂𝑖𝑡)(𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐿𝑖𝑡 − 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑂𝑖𝑡)] − 0.383(𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐶𝑖𝑡 − 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑂𝑖𝑡)
2 
 
From the above formula, Oit, Cit, Hit, and Lit represent open, close, high, and low stock 
prices of a particular firm (i) at time (t) respectively. A similar estimate was adopted by 
Lebedeva (2018) when a normalized volatility series was required as a prerequisite for 
generalized variance decomposition. 
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4.2 Spillover Measure 
To ascertain information on spillover dynamics amongst top companies within the 
STOXX Europe Diversification Select 50 Index, the study employs the spillover index 
developed by Diebold and Yilmaz (2012). Their estimation is hinged on a generalized 
vector autoregressive (VAR) framework which include directional volatility spillovers 
and its forecast-error variance decompositions are not susceptible to permutations of the 
variables being examined. This is achieved by further developing the framework 
by Pesaran and Shin (1998) and  Koop, Pesaran, and Potter (1996). The approach does 
not orthogonalize shocks, therefore the sum of contributions towards variances in 
forecast errors is not expected to be equal to one in all instances. 
 
The main distinction which provides this framework an edge over other traditional 
approaches is that it provides information on the scale, direction and intensity of 
spillovers which are vital to various participants in the money markets, capital markets, 
foreign exchange markets amongst others. It also depicts time-varying spillover 
attributes between entities by means of a rolling window analysis of sample intervals 
(Yin et al., 2020). Another important characteristic in relation to its application in this 
study is that the framework allows for return or volatility spillover measure of assets, 
portfolios and markets across and within countries providing information on important 
trend events  (Diebold and Yilmaz, 2009). 
 
Its building block is a covariance stationary vector autoregression process VAR(p) where 
εt is independent and identically distributed to εi ~ (0, Σ), Σ is a covariance matrix and t 
= 1, 2, 3…., T 
𝑥𝑡 =∑ Φ𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1
𝑥𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡 
 
In the context of our research 𝑥t represents volatilities of N companies, it is an N-
dimensional column vector. Usually the moving average representation of the above 
VAR model is preferred because it is easier to understand and consequently explain. The 
main complexities with the VAR model include too many parameters, difficult parameter 
estimators and convoluted interactions between variables.  The variance decompositions 
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or impulse response function of the moving average version of the estimated parameters 
is critical to unravelling the complexities of the system. The variance decomposition 
approach calculates the proportion variance in forecast errors of all endogenous variables 
by diverse shocks within the VAR model. See below the moving average form, where Ai 
follows a recursive process Ai = Φ1Ai-1 + Φ2Ai-2 + …. + ΦpAi-p and Ai = 0 for i < 0. 
𝑥𝑡 =∑ 𝐴𝑖
∞
𝑡=0
𝜀𝑡−1 
 
Relying on the moving average transformation, Diebold and Yilmaz (2012) proceed to 
define own variance shares “as ratios of H-step error variances in estimating 𝑥i resulting 
from shocks to 𝑥i for i = 1, 2, 3, ….N” and cross variance shares (spillover) “as ratios of 
H-step error variances in estimating 𝑥i resulting from shocks to 𝑥i for i = 1, 2, 3, ….N for 
i ≠ j”. This can be computed as. 
𝜃𝑖𝑗
𝑔(𝐻) =
𝜎𝑗𝑗
−1∑ (𝑒𝑖
′𝐴ℎ ∑𝑒𝑗)
𝐻−1
ℎ=0
∑ (𝑒𝑖
′𝐴ℎ ∑𝐴ℎ
′ 𝑒𝑖)
𝐻−1
ℎ=0
 
 
From the above equation σjj represents ith diagonal feature of the variance-covariance 
matrix (Σ) and ei stands for the selection vector. Normalizing individual entries within 
the variance decomposition matrix by the corresponding row sum helps to ascertain 
useful values required in estimating the spillover index.  
𝜃𝑖𝑗
?̃? =
𝜃𝑖𝑗
𝑔(𝐻)
∑ 𝜃𝑖𝑗
𝑔(𝐻)𝑁𝑗=1
 
 
Consequently, total volatility spillover index which quantifies volatility shock 
contributions of all entities under consideration to overall forecast variance error is 
calculated as. 
𝑆𝑔(𝐻) =
∑ ?̌?𝑖𝑗
𝑔𝑁
𝑖,𝑗=1
𝑖≠𝑗
(𝐻)
∑ ?̌?𝑖𝑗
𝑔(𝐻)𝑁𝑖,𝑗=1
⋅ 100 
 
To enrich our understanding of each entity’s risk level, total volatility spillover is 
disaggregated to account for volatility spillover received by entity i from all other entities 
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under consideration j and volatility spillover spread by entity i to all other entities under 
consideration j as follows. 
𝑆𝑖⋅
𝑔(𝐻) =
∑ ?̌?𝑖𝑗
𝑔𝑁
𝑖,𝑗=1
𝑖≠𝑗
(𝐻)
∑ ?̌?𝑖𝑗
𝑔(𝐻)𝑁𝑖,𝑗=1
⋅ 100 
𝑆⋅𝑖
𝑔(𝐻) =
∑ ?̌?𝑖𝑗
𝑔𝑁
𝑖,𝑗=1
𝑖≠𝑗
(𝐻)
∑ ?̌?𝑖𝑗
𝑔(𝐻)𝑁𝑖,𝑗=1
⋅ 100 
 
Now net volatility spillover which is the difference between volatility shocks transmitted 
by entity i and received from all other entities j is computed as. 
𝑆𝑖
𝑔(𝐻) = 𝑆⋅𝑖
𝑔(𝐻) − 𝑆𝑖⋅
𝑔(𝐻) 
 
Finally, we calculate net pairwise volatility spillover which is the difference in volatility 
shocks transmitted from entity i to entity j and volatility shocks transmitted from entity j 
to entity i. This differs completely from net volatility spillover which deduct transmission 
from an entity and that by all other entities. 
𝑆𝑖𝑗
𝑔(𝐻) = (
?̃?𝑗𝑖
𝑔(𝐻)
∑ ?̌?𝑖𝑘
𝑔 (𝐻)𝑁𝑖,𝑘=1
−
?̃?𝑖𝑗
𝑔(𝐻)
∑ ?̌?𝑗𝑘
𝑔 (𝐻)𝑁𝑗,𝑘=1
) ⋅ 100 
 
4.3 Systemic Risk Measure 
In current literature there are a variety of systemic risk measures. Notable amongst them are 
Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES) and its variant Systemic Expected Shortfall (SES), the 
Systemic Risk Measure (SRISK) and Conditional Value at Risk (CoVaR), a variant of Value 
at Risk (VaR). 
 
This study selects the risk measure developed by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016), ΔCoVaR. 
ΔCoVaR is preferred because of its characteristics which makes it a suitable risk measure for 
the real economy. CoVaR is conditional and directional, thus, CoVaR of a system is 
conditional on entity i which is not the same as CoVaR of entity i conditional on a system. 
This differentiates the interpretation of CoVaR from other measures (MES and SRISK) which 
are conditional on a system. Similarly, we model the systemic risk of a system (group of firms 
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within the real sector) conditional on the state of one of these firms. Additionally, Sedunov 
(2016) found CoVaR to be better at estimating systemic risk in his comparative study.  
 
To fully understand ΔCoVaR we need to explain its building blocks VaR and CoVaR. VaR 
represents an entity’s standalone risk, it is the maximum expected loss of an entity at a 
specified confidence level. CoVaR denotes the VaR of a system conditional on entities within 
the system experiencing distress. Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016) relying on CoVaR then 
defined ΔCoVaR as “the difference between CoVaR conditional on an entity experiencing 
distress and CoVaR conditional on an entity at its median or normal state”. This then 
represents a firm’s contribution to the system’s systemic risk. 
 
Assuming entity i with return rit and confidence level q, VaR
i
q,t can be defined as the q-
quantile of the distribution if returns. 
𝑞 = Pr⁡(𝑟𝑡
𝑖 ≤ 𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑞,𝑡
𝑖 ) 
Based on the above CoVaRj|iq,t as the VaR of system j condition on entity i’s state. 
𝑞 = Pr⁡(𝑟𝑡
𝑠 ≤ 𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑞,𝑡
𝑗|𝑟𝑡
𝑖<𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑞,𝑡|𝑟𝑡
𝑖𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑞,𝑡) 
Finally, we have entity i’s contribution to system j’s systemic risk as. 
∆𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑞,𝑡
𝑗|𝑖
= 𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑞,𝑡
𝑗|𝑟𝑡
𝑖=𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑞,𝑡
𝑖
− 𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑞,𝑡
𝑗|𝑟𝑡
𝑖=𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑖
 
 
Following Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016) we begin the estimation of ΔCoVaR with a 
quantile regression of daily stock prices of entity i.  it displays a joint distribution between 
entity i (Xi) and the system (Xsystem) estimated through a conditional distribution. Considering 
the importance of credit to the real economy, a function of lagged state variables (Mt-1) was 
inculcated into the quantile regression. State variable used include the 3-month spot yield rate, 
1 year forward rate, 5 year forward rate, 10 year forward rate and credit spread. 
𝑋𝑡
𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚 = 𝛼𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚|𝑖 + ?̂?𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚|𝑖𝑋𝑡 + 𝛾
𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚|𝑖𝑀𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡
𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚|𝑖
 
 
From the quantile regression, predicted values for VaRit(q) and CoVaR
i
t(q) are estimated. 
𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡
𝑖(𝑞) = ?̂?𝑞
𝑖 + 𝛾𝑞
𝑖𝑀𝑡−1 
𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡
𝑖(𝑞) = ?̂?𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚|𝑖 + 𝛽𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚|𝑖𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡
𝑖(𝑞) + 𝛾𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚|𝑖𝑀𝑡−1 
ΔCoVaRit is then computed for each entity. 
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∆𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡
𝑖(𝑞) = ?̂?𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚|𝑖(𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡
𝑖(𝑞) − 𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡
𝑖(50%)) 
 
4.4 Panel Regression 
Systemic risk measures in themselves only communicate an entity’s contribution to the risk 
of a system. It is more beneficial to ascertain contributory factors affecting systemic risk in 
order to formulate appropriate strategies in an attempt to manage it.  As a result, a panel 
regression equation has been formulated to identify unobserved effects of innovation and FDI 
– expected characteristics of blue-chip companies - on systemic risk (ΔCoVaR). The selection 
of independent variables for the panel regression equation were based on the author’s 
hypothesis and contributions from previous studies on the subject such as Van Cauernberge 
et al. (2019), Karimalis and Nomikos (2018), Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016) as well as 
Karimalis and Nomikos, (2018). 
 
Consequently, the equation below tries to find the impact of innovation, FDI and other firm 
characteristics on systemic risk. 
∆𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜕
′𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿
′𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽
′𝑥𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖,𝑡 
ΔCoVaRi,t in this case is the measure of systemic. Innoi,t is a variable representing innovation.  
FDIi,t represents a vector of two dummy variables indicating whether a firm has foreign 
subsidiaries (FornSub) or has foreign owners (FornCon). xi,t  represents a vector of firm level  
data used as control variables. These consist of variables such as firm beta, leverage, size, 
VaR, and a dummy for each sector. The dummies for each sector are expected to capture 
sectoral heterogeneity. 
 
All the studies mentioned in the first paragraph of section 4.4 found a positive association 
between beta, size and VaR on one side and systemic risk on the other. This study 
hypothesises a significant negative relationship between innovation and systemic risk. 
However, FDI is expected to show significant positive relationship with systemic. Such 
postulation is derived from the assumption that firms that usually invest in research and 
development are able to gain competitive advantages which translates into superior profits 
and are therefore not likely to contribute to systemic risk. On the other hand, foreign 
companies face certain peculiar disadvantages in their host countries which could contribute 
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to their instability or possible failure and thereby increases its potential to contribute to 
systemic risk.  
 
Four estimations were done in an attempt to uncover the impact each of the selected variables 
has on systemic risk. The models employed include a pooled OLS model, a fixed effects 
model, a first difference model and a random effects model. These models treat data 
differently thereby exhibiting different size effects for each variable. Pooled OLS regard each 
observation in the dataset as independent, fixed effects model eliminates individual effects by 
relying on deviations from individual means, the first difference model also gets rid of 
individual effects using first differences with respect to time and as such nine (9) were lost. 
Random effects model estimates variable effects notwithstanding its variability overtime or 
otherwise. 
 
Theoretically, estimates from a pooled OLS model are inconsistent in situations where there 
is evidence of heterogeneity.  Fixed effects models generate unbiased and consistent estimates 
when observations and time period of the panel data are large enough. Estimates from first 
difference models are based on lesser observations depending on the groups and missing 
values in the dataset. With the right assumptions, estimates from a random effects model are 
efficient and consistent. Due to the disadvantages associated with each model, various 
statistical tests (Lagrange Multiplier Test, Hausman Test, Breusch-Pagan Test, coeftest etc.) 
are conducted to ascertain the best estimates for our dataset. 
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5. Results and Empirical Analysis 
5.1 Spillover Effects 
Under this section we examine volatility spillovers of selected companies according to 
their various sectors of operation.  The goal for this section is to observe volatility 
interactions amongst these companies in response to crises situations and thereby identify 
unstable companies that are likely to pose systemic risk. 
 
5.1.1 Utilities  
The utilities sector is important to the development of any economy or region since it is 
a major backbone to the industrial and manufacturing sector. Volatility within the utilities 
industry mostly reflects the European debt crisis, the Chinese stock market turbulence 
and Brexit. This is expected as governments during these crises were quick to cut 
subsidies to the utilities (European Commission, 2013). 
 
An interesting case is National Grid Plc which shows no volatility in response to various 
shocks but exhibits a sharp spike in August 2011 when there were fears of a contagion 
European debt crisis affecting Italy and Spain. The shock from the European debt crisis 
was evident in all companies within this sector. The most volatile companies within the 
utilities industry were Fortum, Engie, Terna, Enel, Endesa, EDP Energias and Eon.  
These companies demonstrate subsequent volatile moments after the European debt 
crisis corresponding with the Chinese stock market turbulence and Brexit. They also 
provide an indication of moderate correlation amongst themselves in terms of the erratic 
nature of their volatility. 
 
Figure 2: Log -volatilities Utilities Sector 
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As expected, most volatile companies as shown above experienced high levels of 
volatility spillover transmission in response to specific events. EDP Energias exhibited 
high positive transmission during the Chinese stock market turbulence and Brexit 
periods. Enel and Fortum experienced high positive transmission post the global financial 
crisis and the European debt crisis. National Grid, Enel and Terna experienced high 
transmission during the period of the Greek currency crisis. 
 
Figure 3: Net Volatility Spillover Utilities Sector  
 
 
Analysing the decomposition of spillovers transmitted and received within the utilities 
industry, we find that Iberdrola, Endesa and Engie are the major recipients of spillovers 
and therefore seem to be at risk. Major transmitters of spillovers Enel, National Grid, 
Iberdrola, EDP Energias, Fortum and Terna. These are systemically important as their 
spread of volatility spillovers (instability) are high. Iberdrola is a special case as it had 
the highest spillover receipts from the sector however, its spillover contribution was quite 
low resulting in a negative net spillover effect. Other companies in a similar circumstance 
include Endesa, Veolia, Engie and Red Electrica. Such firms can likely to experience 
instability in case of a systemic risk event. 
 
Again, we see that for the utilities sector 45.46 percent of variances in volatility forecast 
error can be attributed to spillovers which is moderate.  
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Table 1: Volatility Spillover for Utilities Sector 
Source: Author’s calculation 
 
5.1.2 Telecommunications 
Telecommunication companies have become more important to the global economy and 
to individual lives in recent decades. They largely focus on disruptive technological 
developments which often impact their business models and competitive positions in an 
attempt to keep and possibly increase their market share. In many countries, access to 
internet connectivity is seen as a basic utility and its consumption has substantial effects 
on the social, cultural, and economic aspects of a modern society. 
 
Figure 4: Log-volatilities Telecoms Sector 
 
 E.on Edp 
Energias 
Endesa Enel Engie Fortum Iberdr. Nat. 
Grid 
Red 
Electr. 
Terna Veolia From 
E.on 63.756 2.112 2.560 6.018 2.446 4.643 3.625 3.909 2.584 5.368 2.976 36.241 
Edp Energia 3.104 60.469 3.689 3.626 2.946 2.374 4.852 4.205 7.670 3.824 3.232 39.831 
Endesa 2.621 8.260 45.451 6.928 4.066 3.335 9.878 4.206 6.339 5.848 3.067 54.549 
Enel 6.592 2.266 2.926 53.931 1.902 3.685 3.849 3.956 2.154 17.324 1.413 46.069 
Engie 5.432 8.583 3.414 6.705 45.690 2.546 7.969 4.591 5.084 3.962 6.023 54.310 
Fortum 3.405 2.384 2.596 3.324 2.471 71.541 2.474 4.481 2.511 2.431 2.382 28.459 
Iberdrola 3.132 8.940 7.560 7.528 7.664 3.664 37.935 3.695 9.736 4.695 5.450 62.065 
Nat. Grid 2.849 2.094 2.747 3.146 1.979 3.937 2.416 73.150 2.353 2.663 2.666 26.850 
Red Electr. 2.054 9.185 5.980 2.789 5.554 3.696 11.181 3.656 47.867 2.879 5.159 52.133 
Terna 4.724 2.510 2.749 19.413 2.315 3.144 3.689 4.776 3.175 51.921 1.581 48.079 
Veolia 4.125 4.345 4.216 5.417 8.173 3.161 7.946 4.964 5.025 4.355 48.243 51.757 
Contribution 
To others 
38.037 50.678 38.448 64.925 39.515 34.185 57.881 42.443 46.634 53.348 33.951 500.044 
Contribution 
including 
own 
101.796 111.147 83.898 118.856 85.206 105.725 95.816 115.593 94.501 105.268 82.193 TCI 
Net 
Spillovers 
1.796 11.147 -16.102 18.856 -
14.794 
5.725 -4.184 15.593 -5.499 5.268 -17.807 45.459 
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In the telecommunications sector, we find that firms mostly experience higher than 
normal volatilities for particular periods. Specifically, around the Greek financial crisis, 
Chinese stock market turbulence and Brexit. Telenor, Telefonica, Swisscom, Orange, 
Elisa, and Deutsche Telekom were relatively stable with isolated high spikes and short 
period volatilities. Over the entire period Tele2 B, Proximus, and KPN were more 
volatile. Some companies show simultaneity in responds to shocks, but magnitude 
usually differ.  
 
Figure 5: Net Volatility Spillover Telecoms Sector  
 
 
In terms of which of the companies received or transmitted more spillovers, we see from 
the graph above that Orange was receiving volatility spillovers post the global financial 
crisis. However, Orange transformed into a net transmitter with an increasing magnitude. 
Elisa experienced the opposite, started as a net transmitter but reverted to a net receiver 
during the Chinese stock market turbulence. KPN, Proximus, Swisscom, Tele2 B and 
Telenor are most of the time net recipients of volatility spillovers and are therefore at 
risk. 
 
From the decomposition of the spillovers, Proximus (41.909), KPN (41.355) and 
Telefonica (40.309) were the highest recipients of volatility spillovers. Unfortunately, 
the volatility transmissions of these firms are low resulting in negative net spillovers. 
Major transmitters in the telecoms sector were Orange, Elisa, and Telefonica. These 
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systemically important firms are crucial since their downturn can be a trigger point for 
systemic risk events. 
 
For the telecoms sector, across our entire sample, 33.92 percent of volatility forecast 
error variance within the sector comes from spillovers which is lower in comparison to 
the utilities sector.  
 
Table 2: Volatility Spillover for Telecoms Sector 
Source: Author’s calculation 
 
5.1.3 Industry 
From the figure below, we see that OMV and Snam Rete show more volatility in their 
stock prices during the study period. A similarity shared across companies within the 
industrial sector is that the volatilities seem to be clustered. Kone B, Enagas and 
Flughafen exhibited more volatilities.  There seem to be a weak positive association 
between the volatility trends between Snam Rete and Enagas because both operate within 
the oil and gas sector.  
 
 
 
 
 
 Deuts Elisa KPN Orange Proxim Swiss Tele2. Telefo Telenor From 
Deutche 74.897 4.208 2.481 2.121 2.078 3.319 3.054 3.429 4.414 25.103 
Elisa 4.853 67.252 1.625 2.472 3.206 4.377 6.754 2.062 7.398 32.748 
KPN 5.315 2.423 58.645 15.232 4.178 2.218 1.785 7.771 2.524 41.355 
Orange 4.599 2.903 2.838 68.195 1.953 2.649 2.061 12.263 2.539 31.805 
Proximus 5.075 2.746 4.671 12.126 58.091 2.888 2.401 7.779 4.223 41.909 
Swisscom 2.115 8.934 2.182 2.224 2.601 67.166 5.807 1.908 7.062 32.834 
Tele2 2.144 10.848 1.372 3.023 2.613 2.137 70.686 2.303 4.872 29.314 
Telefonica 4.252 4.206 2.319 18.058 2.328 2.656 2.171 59.691 4.318 40.309 
Telenor 5.947 6.176 1.600 2.262 2.923 3.519 5.336 2.638 70.099 29.901 
Contribution 
To others 
34.300 42.445 19.089 57.518 21.380 23.673 29.369 40.151 37.353 305.277 
Contribution 
including 
own 
109.197 109.698 77.734 125.713 79.471 90.839 100.055 99.842 107.451 TCI 
Net 
Spillovers 
9.197 9.698 -22.266 25.713 -20.529 -9.161 0.055 -0.158 7.451 33.920 
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Figure 6: Log-volatilities Industrial Sector 
 
 
Figure 7: Net Volatility Spillover Industrial Sector  
 
 
In terms of the decomposition of spillovers transmitted and received within the industrial 
sector, we find that Enagas (14.672) and OMV (12.544) are the top recipients of 
spillovers. On the other hand, the major transmitters of spillovers is Snam Rete (17.985) 
and Enagas (12.017). Enagas is an interesting scenario because the company was both a 
major receiver and transmitter. It is not surprising that it was one of the companies at risk 
together with OMV. On the other hand, the major transmitter was Snam Rete, the 
dominance of Snam Rete is not surprising as from the net volatility spillover chart the 
company is usually a net transmitter.  
 
We also see that 12.342 percent of variances in volatility forecast error can be attributed 
to spillovers which is very low for this specific sector, even lower thank the telecoms and 
utilities but again we have only 5 companies for this analysis.  
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Table 3: Volatility Spillover for Industrial Sector 
Source: Author’s calculation 
 
5.1.4 Real Estate & Construction 
From the figure displaying volatilities in the real estate and construction sector, we see 
that apart from Covivio and Unibail, the rest of the companies experience much more 
volatility within the first part of the period under investigation (thus, post the global 
financial crisis and the Greek currency crisis). Tag Immobilien was the most volatile in 
the beginning but overall Unibail was the most volatile overtime. Klepierre and Gecina 
were the least volatile but generally each of the companies reflected at least one of the 
major crises enumerated.  
 
Figure 8: Log-volatilities Real Estate & Construction Sector 
 
 
The net volatility figure shows Unibail as a persistent net receiver of volatility spillovers 
and Klepierre as a persistent transmitter of volatility spillovers. Although the receipts to 
 Flugha Kone B Enagas OMV Snam 
Rete 
From 
Flughfen 88.802 2.886 2.791 2.603 2.918 11.198 
Kone B 2.282 88.552 1.557 3.257 4.352 11.448 
Enagas 3.294 1.558 85.328 1.705 8.116 14.672 
OMV 2.885 3.446 3.615 87.456 2.599 12.544 
Snam Rete 2.546 2.957 4.055 2.288 88.153 11.847 
Contribution 
To others 
11.007 10.847 12.017 9.853 17.985 61.709 
Contribution 
including own 
99.809 99.399 97.309 97.309 106.138 TCI 
Net Spillovers -0.191 -0.601 -2.655 -2.691 6.138 12.342 
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Unibail grew in magnitude overtime, that of Klepierre declined in magnitude with a spike 
at the later stages. Gecina’s experience was interesting receiving volatility spillovers 
between 2010 and 2013 but transforming into a transmitter afterwards. The rest of the 
companies exhibits both transmission and receipt of spillovers at different periods. 
 
Figure 9: Net Volatility Spillover Real Estate & Construction Sector  
 
 
Table 4: Volatility Spillover for Real Estate & Construction Sector 
Source: Author’s calculation 
 
Analysing which companies were contributing more volatility spillovers to others in the 
real estate and construction sector as well as those at risk by being major recipients, we 
find that  Unibail with 48.624 percent has the highest spillovers receipts and its net 
spillovers contribution was the lowest by far in the sector with -34.172. Covivio, 
 Coviovio Gecina Klepierre Tag 
Immo 
Unibail Acciona From 
Coviovio 61.734 12.651 14.141 3.287 4.325 3.862 38.266 
Gecina 7.969 70.490 12.053 2.794 2.905 3.788 29.510 
Klepierre  12.582 11.134 67.567 2.150 2.797 3.770 32.433 
Tag Immo 2.637 3.453 2.583 86.610 2.128 2.589 13.390 
Unibail 13.701 10.452 16.788 2.817 51.376 4.865 48.624 
Acciona 4.952 4.957 4.298 3.593 2.297 79.903 20.097 
Contribution 
To others 
41.842 42.647 49.864 14.641 14.452 18.874 182.320 
Contribution 
including own 
103.375 113.137 117.431 101.251 65.828 98.776 TCI 
Net Spillovers 3.575 13.137 17.431 1.251 -34.172 -1.224 30.387 
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Klepierre and Gecina were relatively impacted less by volatility spillovers with 38.266, 
32.433 and 29.510 percent, respectively. These three companies are however 
systemically important being major transmitters of volatility spillovers. Considering net 
spillover measures, Unibail and Acciona are at high risk in an event of a systemic shock. 
 
The total variances in volatility forecast error that can be attributed to spillovers in this 
real estate and construction sector was 30.387 percent which is somewhat moderate.  
 
5.1.5 Health & Lifestyle 
In the following figure we see that Sanofi is the most volatile company with the highest 
volatilities recorded post the global financial crisis and the Greek currency crisis. 
Novartis and Unilever were moderately volatile with periodic clustered volatilities in 
tandem with movements in Sanofi.  It is interesting to see Glaxo - a British company - 
not being responsive to events during Brexit. Uniliver shows more volatilities during the 
Chinese market turbulence. 
 
Figure 10: Log-volatilities Health & Lifestyle Sector 
 
 
Figure 11: Net Volatility Spillover Health & Lifestyle Sector  
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The net volatility spillover figure shows unique trends for companies in the health and 
lifestyle sectors. However, a similar negative net spillover spike is seen during the 
Chinese market turbulence for all companies with the exception of Ahold. A similar 
response was seen in most companies within the industrial sector. This could be evidence 
of complementarities between the two sectors and their integration with the Chinese 
market or economy. Generally, the companies alternating periods of positive and 
negative volatility transmissions although the magnitude and cycles differ. 
 
Table 5: Volatility Spillover for Health & Lifestyle Sector 
Source: Author’s calculation 
 
From the analysis of which companies transmitted more volatility spillovers in the health 
and lifestyle sector, we find that Novartis and Sanofi are the major recipient of spillovers 
and so both seem to be at risk compared to the rest. On the other hand, both companies 
in addition to Ahold were the major transmitters of spillovers to the rest of the companies. 
Thus, these can be considered as systemically important companies that might affect the 
stability of the industry in case of a systemic shock. Unilever, Sodexo, and Glaxo 
experience negative net spillovers are more at risk to face instability.  
 
Additionally, across the lifestyle industry, 22.687 percent of volatility forecast error 
variance in all the companies comes from spillovers. 
 Ahold Unilever Sodexo Glaxo Novartis Sanofi From 
Ahold 77.897 2.204 1.916 2.678 7.442 7.863 22.103 
Unilever 2.795 85.375 3.408 1.915 2.020 4.487 14.625 
Sodexo 2.760 3.516 85.870 1.872 3.047 2.934 14.130 
Glaxo 3.322 1.926 2.370 86.078 3.688 2.590 13.922 
Novartis 8.149 1.658 3.016 2.975 64.613 19.588 35.387 
Sanofi 9.273 2.291 1.773 2.836 19.780 64.047 35.953 
Contribution 
To others 
26.300 11.595 12.508 12.277 35.978 37.462 136.120 
Contribution 
including own 
104.197 96.970 98.378 98.355 100.591 101.509 TCI 
Net Spillovers 4.197 -3.030 -1.622 -1.645 0.591 1.509 22.687 
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5.2 Systemic Risk Measure  
From our estimations, we find unique dynamics of systemic risk (ΔCoVaR) for sectors 
within the STOXX Europe Diversification Select 50 EUR Index over the period under 
consideration. Most prominent for most of these sectors is the build-up of systemic risk 
between the year 2014 and 2017. As seen in Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016) there is 
evidence of systemic risk being procyclical, while risk accumulates over the period, 
adverse effects from unexpected shocks are then magnified. The cycle in this case 
corresponds with the Chinese stock market turbulence and the Brexit vote. This confirms 
the integration of Euro market since the selected firms originate from various countries 
within the region as well as the region’s interactions with the Chinese economy. 
 
Figure 12: Average ΔCoVaR per Sector 
 
 
Distinctively, the construction, real estate, telecoms, and utility sectors experienced 
varying degrees of spikes during the later stages of the global financial crisis. Perhaps, 
these sectoral response to unexpected shocks can be analysed as compound effects since 
some crisis situations overlap. For instance, the later stages of the global financial crisis 
overlap with the Greek currency crisis just as the later parts of the Chinese stock market 
turbulence  
 
As expected, the retail sector exhibits stable risk over with very frequent seasonal spikes. 
Most volatile sectors include industrial, telecoms, construction, real estate, oil and gas as 
well as healthcare. These effects are expected to translate into significant impacts in the 
regression results. 
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5.3 Regression Results 
From the results of the panel regression we find the effect of innovation and FDI on 
systemic risk. A combination of the F-test for individual effects and the Lagrange 
multiplier test for unbiased panels indicates significant effects, meaning the fixed effects 
and random effect models are more appropriate in comparison to the pool OLS model. 
To select the most appropriate models amongst the two, the Hausman test was applied. 
Results from the test indicates that the fixed effects model is consistent therefore the 
random effects model is ignored.  
 
However, the Breusch-Pagan test indicate heteroscedasticity in the model therefore the 
estimate below is generated with corrected standard errors based on the Arellano (1987) 
method.  
 
Table 6: Fixed Effects Regression Results 
 Dependent variable: log(ΔCoVaR) 
 Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|) 
Beta 1.0647e+00 1.2186e-01 8.7372 2.498e-16 *** 
log(VaR)          9.5015e-01 1.2348e-02 76.9452 < 2.2e-16 *** 
log(Leverage)    -1.3216e-01 1.8506e-02 -7.1417 8.434e-12 *** 
log(Size)         2.1254e-02 6.0485e-03 3.5138 0.0005171 *** 
Inno -5.1240e-05 5.3163e-06 -9.6384 < 2.2e-16 *** 
Dummy_FornCon    -1.6388e-01 1.2953e-02 -12.6519 < 2.2e-16 *** 
Dummy_FornSub     4.6204e-01 3.2766e-02 14.1013 < 2.2e-16 *** 
Dummy_Utilities -3.0572e-01 9.7211e-03 -31.4492 < 2.2e-16 *** 
Dummy_Telecoms   -3.3845e-01 1.6670e-02 -20.3037 < 2.2e-16 *** 
Dummy_RealEst     3.6605e-02 3.9336e-02 0.9306 0.3529060 
Dummy_Health      7.7450e-02 3.3408e-02 2.3183 0.0211751 * 
Dummy_Indust     -4.7010e-01 1.4852e-02 -31.6511 < 2.2e-16 *** 
Dummy_Oil         9.5432e-03 1.2646e-02 0.7547 0.4511107 
Dummy_Retail     -1.9183e-01 2.8196e-02 -6.8036 6.483e-11 *** 
Dummy_Const      -6.2695e-01 4.0479e-02 -15.4883 < 2.2e-16 *** 
Dummy_Pers        2.7392e-02 2.2301e-02 1.2283 0.2203933 
     
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
Source: Author’s calculation 
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The estimates show a significant negative relationship between innovation and systemic 
risk. Specifically, other things being equal, every Euro spent on innovation reduces log 
of ΔCoVaR by 0.00005124 percent. Contrary to our hypothesis, variables for FDI show 
mixed effects. Ceteris paribus, firms with foreign shareholders (FornCon) exhibit log of 
ΔCoVaR which is 0.6388 percent less in comparison to firms without foreign owners. 
However, firms with foreign subsidiaries (FornSub) had log of ΔCoVaR being 0.46204 
percent higher in relation to companies without foreign subsidiaries. This suggest that 
foreign direct investments through the establishment of foreign subsidiaries serve as 
channels for transferring systemic risk. 
 
In terms of sectoral activities, firms in the health sector increase log of ΔCoVaR by 
0.07745 percent. On the other hand, firms in the utilities sector, telecom sector, industrial 
sector, retail sector and construction sector decrease log of ΔCoVaR by 0.30572 percent, 
0.33845 percent, 0.4701 percent, 0.19183 percent, and 0.62695 percent. The health sector 
increases systemic risk, and this is understandable considering its direct impact on all 
sectors. In contradiction to the findings of Van Cauernberge et al. (2019) sectors that 
provide support services such as telecoms and utilities rather reduce systemic risk. 
 
Now focusing on other firm characteristics, an increase in firm beta by a percentage point 
increases log of ΔCoVaR by 1.0647 percent. An increase in log of VaR and log of Size 
by one percent increases log of ΔCoVaR by 0.95015 percent and 0.02125 percent. Also, 
an increase in Log of leverage by one percent reduces log of ΔCoVaR by 0.13216 
percent. These results are not surprising as beta and VaR are measures of a firm volatility 
and standalone risk. It is expected that risk measures correlate with systemic risk. Again, 
firms with large current asset values can have larger adverse effects through its 
interactions with debtors and creditors. 
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6. Conclusions 
This study endeavored to identify systemically important companies by evaluating the 
volume of volatility spillover received and transmitted between blue-chip these 
companies in the STOXX Europe diversification select 50 Index. Further, it investigated 
the effects of innovation and FDI on systemic risk amongst these companies. 
 
Our findings from the spillovers analysis provide some insights into the interactions 
between companies within a specific sector. We identify systemically important 
companies that are likely to contribute to the instability of others as a result of the 
magnitude of spillover volatilities they transmit. Transfer of instability could serve as a 
spark for a systemic risk event. The results show that the utility sector presents the highest 
percentage of variances in volatility forecast error due to spillovers of 45.46 percent, 
followed by the telecommunication and Real estate and construction with 33.92 and 
30.387 percent, respectively. Interestingly, there seems not to be a link between volatility 
levels and the volume of spillover emitted. 
 
With regards to the impacts of innovation and FDI on systemic risk, the results confirm 
that there is a negative relationship between innovation and systemic risk which means 
that firms who are more innovative can decrease their contribution to systemic risk. This 
result agrees with our hypothesis since innovative firms tend to gain competitive 
advantages and are often more profitable in comparison with their competitors and 
therefore are likely to undergo stress or be impacted by the failure of related companies. 
 
In the case of FDI, we find results that are different from our initial hypothesis. On one 
hand, we find that firms with foreign control decreased systemic risk in comparison with 
firms without foreign control. This could be as a result of the effects of diversification 
and a common currency system. Our findings contradict that of Van Cauwenberge et al., 
(2019) who found a positive relationship between foreign control and systemic risk in 
the Netherlands. 
 
On the other hand, firms with foreign subsidiaries increase systemic risk contribution. 
This suggests that FDI through the establishment of foreign subsidiaries serve as 
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channels to spread systemic risk through the firm’s operations in other countries. 
Therefore, Multinational companies can contribute to the spread of systemic risk through 
international networks to domestic or host economies. This confirms the findings of 
Goldin and Mariathasan (2014) as well as Battiston et al. (2007) who find that due to 
transactions between subsidiaries such as outsourcing and subcontracting, the failure of 
a firm most likely will transmit negative externalities to its subsidiaries and thereby 
trigger systemic risk. 
 
Several important recommendations can be made for future studies. With the availability 
of adequate firm-level data, our research can be expanded to examine such effects within 
countries (a single market), regions, as well as other asset classes across different sectors. 
We recommend further exploration of volatility spillovers as an early warning system 
for impending crises. Also, a comparison of systemic risk in specific sectors of the real 
economy within developing economies could be investigated and contrasted with 
findings from developed economies. 
 
  
35 
 
7. References 
Acharya, V., Pedersen, L. H., Philippon, T., & Richardson, M. (2010). Measuring 
systemic risk. AFA 2011 Denver Meetings Paper. In Available at Social Science 
Research Network (SSRN): http://ssrn. com/abstract (Vol. 1573171). 
Acharya, V., Pedersen, L. H., Philippon, T., & Richardson, M. (2010). Measuring 
systemic risk. AFA 2011 Denver Meetings Paper. In Available at Social Science 
Research Network (SSRN): http://ssrn. com/abstract (Vol. 1573171). 
Acharya, V., Philippon, T., Richardson, M., & Roubini, N. (2009). The financial crisis 
of 2007‐2009: Causes and remedies. Financial markets, institutions & instruments, 
18(2), 89-137. 
Adrian, T., & Brunnermeier, M. K. (2009). CoVar: a method for macroprudential 
regulation. Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Report, 348. 
Adrian, T., & Brunnermeier, M. K. (2016). CoVar. Am. Econ. Rev. 106 (7), 1705–1741. 
Andrieş, A. M., Nistor, S., & Sprincean, N. (2017). The impact of central bank 
transparency on systemic risk: Evidence from Central and Eastern Europe. Research 
in International Business and Finance 51 (2020) 100921. 
Apostolakis, G., & Papadopoulos, A. P. (2014). Financial stress spillovers in advanced 
economies. Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, 32, 
128-149. 
Apostolou, A., Beirne, & John. (2019). Volatility spillovers of unconventional monetary 
policy to emerging market economies. Economic Modelling. Volume 79, Pages 
118-129. 
Arellano, M. (1987) Computing robust standard errors for within-group 
estimators, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 49(4), pp. 431--434. 
Battiston, S., Gatti, D. D., Gallegati, M., Greenwald, B., & Stiglitz, J. E. (2007). Credit 
chains and bankruptcy propagation in production networks. Journal of Economic 
Dynamics and Control, 31(6), 2061-2084. 
Beirne, J., Caporale, J., Schulze-Ghattas, M., & Spagnolo, N. (2013). Volatility 
spillovers and contagion from mature to emerging stock markets. Review of 
International Economics, 21 (5) (2013), pp. 1060-1075. 
Bems, R., Johnson, R. C., & Yi, K. M. (2013). The great trade collapse. Annu. Rev. Econ., 
5(1), 375-400. 
36 
 
Billio, M., Getmansky, M., Lo, A. W., & Pelizzon, L. (2012). Econometric measures of 
connectedness and systemic risk in the finance and insurance sectors. Journal of 
financial economics, 104(3), 535-559. 
Bruno, V., & Shin, H. S. (2015). Capital flows and the risk-taking channel of monetary 
policy. Journal of Monetary Economics, 71, 119-132. 
Bruno, V., & Shin, H. S. (2015). Cross-border banking and global liquidity. The Review 
of Economic Studies, 82(2), 535-564. 
Buch, C. M., Krause, T., & Tonzer, L. (2019). Drivers of systemic risk: Do national and 
European perspectives differ? Journal of International Money and Finance, 91, 160-
176. 
Caballero, R. J., Farhi, E., & Gourinchas, P.-O. (2008). An Equilibrium Model of ‘Global 
Imbalances’ and Low Interest Rates. American Economic Review 98 (1): 358–93. 
Cetorelli, N., & Goldberg, L. S. (2012). Liquidity management of US global banks: 
Internal capital markets in the great recession. Journal of International Economics, 
88(2), 299-311. 
Cho, S., Hyde, S., & Nguyen, N. (2015). Time-varying regional and global integration 
and contagion: Evidence from style portfolios. International Review of Financial 
Analysis, 42, 109-131. 
Collins, M (2015). The big bank bailout 
[https://www.forbes.com/sites/mikecollins/2015/07/14/the-big-bank-
bailout/#2e8687222d83] Retrieved on [30 May, 2020] 
Diebold, F. X., & Yilmaz, K. (2009). Measuring financial asset return and volatility 
spillovers, with application to global equity markets. Economic Journal, 119 (2009), 
pp. 158-171. 
Diebold, F. X., & Yilmaz, K. (2012). Better to Give than to Receive: Predictive 
Directional Measurement of Volatility Spillovers. International Journal of 
Forecasting, 28 (2012), pp. 57-66. 
Diebold, F. X., & Yılmaz, K. (2014). On the network topology of variance 
decompositions: Measuring the connectedness of financial firms. Journal of 
Econometrics, 182(1), 119-134. 
37 
 
Dungey, M., Luciani, M., Matei, M., & Veredas, D. (2015). Surfing through the GFC: 
Systemic risk in Australia. Tasmanian School of Business and Economics, 
University of Tasmania. 
Dunning (1979) Toward an Eclectic Theory of International Production: Some Empirical 
Tests. Journal of International Business Studies. 
Eaton, J., Kortum, S., Neiman, B., & Romalis, J. (2016). Trade and the global recession. 
American Economic Review, 106(11), 3401-38. 
 European Commission (2013). Is European debt crisis undermining interest in low-
carbon energy? [https://setis.ec.europa.eu/publications/setis-magazine/wind-
energy/european-debt-crisis-undermining-interest-low-carbon-energy] Retrieved 
on [17 July, 2020] 
Fryzlewicz, P. (2005). Modelling and forecasting financial log-returns as locally 
stationary wavelet processes. Journal of Applied Statistics, 32(5), 503. 
Garman, M. B., & Klass, M. J. (1980). On the estimation of security price volatilities 
from historical data. Journal of business, 67-78. 
Gelos, G., & Surti, J. (2016). The growing importance of financial spillovers from 
emerging market economies. VOX. CEPR Policy Portal. 
Goldin, I., & Mariathasan, M. (2015). The butterfly defect: How globalization creates 
systemic risks, and what to do about it. Princeton University Press. 
Han, D. (2019). Network analysis of the Chinese stock market during the turbulence of 
2015–2016 using log-returns, volumes, and mutual information. Physica A: 
Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, 523, 1091-1109. 
Huidrom, R., Kose, A., & Ohnsorge, F. (2016). Painful spillovers from slowing BRICS 
growth.The VoxEU, 17. 
Karimalis, E. N., & Nomikos, N. K. (2018). Measuring systemic risk in the European 
banking sector: A Copula CoVaR approach. The European Journal of Finance, 
24(11), 944-975. 
Kerste, M., Gerritsen, M., Weda, J., & Tieben, B. (2015). Systemic risk in the energy 
sector—Is there need for financial regulation?  
Koop, G., Pesaran, M. H., & Potter, S. M. (1996). Impulse response analysis in nonlinear 
multivariate models. Journal of econometrics, 74(1), 119-147. 
38 
 
Kose, A. M., Prasad, E., Rogoff, K., & Wei, S.-J. (2009). Financial Globalization: A 
Reappraisal. International Monetary Fund. Staff Papers, 8-62. 
Lebedeva, E. (2018). Spillovers between cryptocurrencies. Network map of 
cryptocurrencies, Master Thesis. University of Tartu. 
Mendoza, E. G., & Quadrini, V. (2010). Financial globalization, financial crises and 
contagion. Journal of Monetary Economics, Volume 57, Issue 1, Pages 24-39. 
Mendoza, E. G., Quadrini, V., & Rios-Rull, J.-V. (2009). Financial Integration, Financial 
Development, and global imbalances. J. Political Econ. 117 (3), 371–416. 
Milesi-Ferretti, G.-M., & Tille, C. (2011). The great retrenchment: International capital 
flows during the global financial crisis. Economic Policy pp. 289–346. 
Moshirian, F. (2015). Global governance and financial stability. Journal of Banking and 
Finance, (55), 358-360. 
Nishimura, Y., Sun, & Bianxia. (2018). The intraday volatility spillover index approach 
and an application in the Brexit vote. Volume 55, Pages 241-253: Journal of 
International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money. 
Pernagallo, G., & Torrisi, B. (2019). An empirical analysis on the degree of Gaussianity 
and long memory of financial returns in emerging economies. Physica A: Statistical 
Mechanics and its Applications, 527, 121296. 
Pesaran, H. H., & Shin, Y. (1998). Generalized impulse response analysis in linear 
multivariate models. Economics letters, 58(1), 17-29. 
Politi, M., Millot, N., & Chakraborti, A. (2012). The near-extreme density of intraday 
log-returns. Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, 391(1-2), 147-
155. 
Prasad, E., Rogoff, K., Wei, S. J., & Kose, M. A. (2010). Financial Globalization and 
Macroeconomic Policies. Handbook of Development Economics. 
Rossi, S. & Malavasi, R. (2016) Financial Crisis, Bank Behaviour and Credit Crunch, 
vol. 1, Springer International Publishing, Switzerland. 
Sedunov, J. (2016). What is the systemic risk exposure of financial institutions? Journal 
of Financial Stability, 24, 71-87. 
Singh, P., & Kumar, A. P. (2010). Price and volatility spillovers across North American, 
European, and Asian stock markets. International Review of Financial Analysis, 19 
(2010), pp. 55-64. 
39 
 
Syriopoulos, T. (2007). Dynamic linkages between emerging European and developed 
stock markets: Has the EMU any impact? International Review of Financial 
Analysis, 16 (1) (2007), pp. 41-60. 
Trapp, M., & Wewel, C. (2013). Transatlantic systemic risk. Journal of Banking & 
Finance, 37(11), 4241-4255. 
Van Cauwenberge, A., Vancauteren, M., Braekers, R., & Vandemaele, S. (2019). 
International trade, foreign direct investments, and firms’ systemic risk: Evidence 
from the Netherlands. Economic Modelling, 81, 361-386. 
Worthington, A., & Higgs, H. (2004). Transmission of equity returns and volatility in 
Asian developed and emerging markets: a multivariate GARCH 
analysis. International Journal of Finance & Economics, 9(1), 71-80. 
Wu, F. (2018). Sectoral contributions to systemic risk in the Chinese stock market. 
Finance Research Letters 31 (2019) 386–390. 
Yarovaya, L., Brzeszczyński, J., Lau, M., & Keung, C. (2016). Intra- and inter-regional 
return and volatility spillovers across emerging and developed markets: Evidence 
from stock indices and stock index futures. International Review of Financial 
Analysis. Volume 43, Pages 96-114. 
Yin, K., Liu, Z., & Jin, X. (2020). Interindustry volatility spillover effects in China’s 
stock market. Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, 539, 122936. 
 
 
 
  
40 
 
Appendix 
Composition of Stoxx Europe diversification select 50 as at April 29, 2020 
Sector Firm Country of Origin 
Utilities Red Electrica Corporation 
Naturgy Energy Group 
Veolia Environment 
Endesa 
Terna 
Enel 
E. On 
Engie 
National Grid 
EDP Energias De Portugal 
Fortum 
Uniper 
Terna 
Iberdrola 
Spain 
Spain 
France 
Spain 
Italy 
Italy 
Germany 
France 
United Kingdom 
Portugal 
Finland 
Germany 
Italy 
Spain 
Telecoms Elisa Corporation 
Orange 
Deutsche Telekom 
Proximus 
Tele2 B 
Telenor 
Swisscom 
Sunrise 
KPN 
Telefonica Deutschland 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Belgium 
Sweden 
Norway 
Switzerland 
Switzerland 
Netherlands 
Germany 
Real Estate Klepeirre 
Gecina 
Tag Immoblien AG 
Covivio 
Leg Immobilien 
Grand City Properties 
Immofinanz 
Aroundtown (FRA) 
Unibail-Rodamco-Westfield 
France 
France 
Germany 
Real Estate 
Germany 
Germany 
Austria 
Germany 
France 
Healthcare Novartis 
Glaxosmithkline 
Sanofi 
Switzerland 
United Kingdom 
France 
Industrial Goods & Services Kone B 
Flughafen Zurich 
Alstom 
Finland 
Switzerland 
France 
Oil & Gas Snam Rete Gas 
Enagas 
OMV 
Italy 
Spain 
Austria 
Retail Ahold Delhaize 
Metro AG 
Netherlands 
Germany 
Construction & Materials Acciona S. A Spain 
Personal & Household Uniliver Netherlands 
Travel & Leisure Sodexo France 
Insurance TRYG 
Topdanmark 
Denmark 
Denmark 
Bank Bawag Group AG Austria 
Food & Beverage Coca Cola HBC United Kingdom 
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Selected Companies, 37 out of 50 For Spillover Analysis 
Sector Firm Country of Origin 
Utilities Red Electrica Corporation 
Naturgy Energy Group 
Veolia Environment 
Endesa 
Terna 
Enel 
E. On 
Engie 
National Grid 
EDP Energias De Portugal 
Fortum 
Spain 
Spain 
France 
Spain 
Italy 
Italy 
Germany 
France 
United Kingdom 
Portugal 
Finland 
Telecoms Elisa Corporation 
Orange 
Deutsche Telekom 
Proximus 
Tele2 B 
Telenor 
Swisscom 
Telefonica Deutschland 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Belgium 
Sweden 
Norway 
Switzerland 
Germany 
Real Estate & Construction Klepeirre 
Gecina 
Tag Immoblien 
Covivio 
Unibail Rodem 
Acciona S. A 
France 
France 
Germany 
Real Estate 
 
Spain 
Industrial Goods & Services Kone B 
Flughafen 
Enagas 
Snam Rete Gas 
OMV 
Finland 
Switzerland 
Spain 
Italy 
Austria 
Lifestyle Ahold Delhaize 
Unilever  
Sodexo 
Novartis 
Glaxosmithkline 
Sanofi 
Netherlands 
Netherlands 
France 
Switzerland 
United Kingdom 
France 
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Selected Companies, 33 out of 50 For Systemic Risk Analysis 
Sector Firm Country of Origin 
Utilities Red Electrica Corporation 
Naturgy Energy Group 
Veolia Environment 
Endesa 
Terna 
Enel 
E. On 
Engie 
National Grid 
EDP Energias De Portugal 
Fortum 
Spain 
Spain 
France 
Spain 
Italy 
Italy 
Germany 
France 
United Kingdom 
Portugal 
Finland 
Telecoms Elisa Corporation 
Orange 
Deutsche Telekom 
Proximus 
Tele2 B 
Telenor 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Belgium 
Sweden 
Norway 
Real Estate Klepeirre 
Gecina 
Tag Immoblien 
Covivio 
France 
France 
Germany 
Real Estate 
Healthcare Novartis 
Glaxosmithkline 
Sanofi 
Switzerland 
United Kingdom 
France 
Industrial Goods & Services Kone B 
Flughafen 
Alstom 
Finland 
Switzerland 
France 
Oil & Gas Snam Rete 
Enagas 
Italy 
Spain 
Retail Ahold Delhaize Netherlands 
Construction & Materials Acciona S. A Spain 
Personal & Household Uniliver Netherlands 
Travel & Leisure Sodexo France 
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Panel data for regression and their sources 
Variable Definition Source 
VaR Largest loss a firm can expect at 95% 
confidence interval 
Author’s 
calculation 
Delta_CoVaR A measure of a firm’s contribution to 
general systemic risk  
Author’s 
calculation 
Beta A measure of a firm’s responsiveness to 
the market 
Author’s 
calculation 
Leverage Ratio of firm total debt to common equity Author’s 
calculation 
Size Firm’s total value of current assets Amadeus 
Database 
Inno Spending on research and development Author’s 
calculation 
Dummy Foreign Control Assign 1 to firms with 10% or more 
foreign owners and 0 otherwise 
Amadeus 
Database 
Dummy Foreign 
Subsidiary 
Assign 1 to firms with foreign subsidiaries 
and 0 otherwise  
Amadeus 
Database 
Dummy - Sectors Assign 1 to the sector a firm belongs to and 
0 otherwise  
Amadeus 
Database 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
44 
 
Panel Regression Results  
======================================================================== 
                                  Dependent variable:                    
                -------------------------------------------------------- 
                                    log(Delta_CoVaR)                     
                Pooled OLS Fixed effects First difference Random effects 
                   (1)          (2)            (3)             (4)       
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Beta             0.470***    1.065***        1.149***        0.470***    
                 (0.086)      (0.118)        (0.129)         (0.086)     
log(VaR)         0.974***    0.950***        0.936***        0.974***    
                 (0.026)      (0.025)        (0.027)         (0.026)     
log(Leverage)   -0.121***    -0.132***      -0.216***       -0.121***    
                 (0.033)      (0.031)        (0.030)         (0.033)     
log(Size)         0.021        0.021          0.039*          0.021      
                 (0.014)      (0.013)        (0.016)         (0.014)     
Inno            -0.00005**   -0.0001**      -0.0001***      -0.00005**   
                (0.00002)    (0.00002)      (0.00002)       (0.00002)    
Dummy_FornCon    -0.157*      -0.164*        -0.208**        -0.157*     
                 (0.070)      (0.065)        (0.074)         (0.070)     
Dummy_FornSub    0.503***    0.462***        0.552***        0.503***    
                 (0.057)      (0.054)        (0.058)         (0.057)     
Dummy_Utilities  -0.246**    -0.306***        -0.737         -0.246**    
                 (0.083)      (0.078)        (0.389)         (0.083)     
Dummy_Telecoms  -0.320***    -0.338***        -0.382        -0.320***    
                 (0.087)      (0.082)        (0.365)         (0.087)     
Dummy_RealEst     0.115        0.037          0.088           0.115      
                 (0.098)      (0.093)        (0.345)         (0.098)     
Dummy_Health      0.028        0.077          -0.129          0.028      
                 (0.123)      (0.116)        (0.302)         (0.123)     
Dummy_Indust    -0.425***    -0.470***       -0.687**       -0.425***    
                 (0.091)      (0.086)        (0.256)         (0.091)     
Dummy_Oil         0.057        0.010          -0.068          0.057      
                 (0.096)      (0.090)        (0.224)         (0.096)     
Dummy_Retail      -0.177      -0.192          -0.316          -0.177     
                 (0.113)      (0.106)        (0.190)         (0.113)     
Dummy_Const     -0.465***    -0.627***      -0.701***       -0.465***    
                 (0.114)      (0.109)        (0.157)         (0.114)     
Dummy_Pers        0.041        0.027          -0.020          0.041      
                 (0.116)      (0.109)        (0.111)         (0.116)     
Constant        -1.393***                     -0.020        -1.393***    
                 (0.138)                     (0.022)         (0.138)     
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Observations       297          297            288             297       
R2                0.965        0.970          0.964           0.965      
Adjusted R2       0.963        0.968          0.962           0.963      
======================================================================== 
Note:                                      *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 
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Other Statistical Tests 
F test for individual effects 
 
data:  f1 
F = 5.8496, df1 = 8, df2 = 272, p-value = 6.627e-07 
alternative hypothesis: significant effects 
 
Lagrange Multiplier Test - (Breusch-Pagan) for balanced panels 
 
data:  f1 
chisq = 6.4875, df = 1, p-value = 0.01086 
alternative hypothesis: significant effects 
 
Hausman Test 
 
data:  f1 
chisq = 52.667, df = 16, p-value = 8.546e-06 
alternative hypothesis: one model is inconsistent 
 
Durbin-Watson test for serial correlation in panel models 
 
data:  f1 
DW = 2.7978, p-value = 0.3653 
alternative hypothesis: serial correlation in idiosyncratic errors 
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Breusch-Pagan LM test for cross-sectional dependence in panels 
 
data:  log(Delta_CoVaR) ~ Beta + log(VaR) + log(Leverage) + log(Size) +     Inno + 
Dummy_FornCon + Dummy_FornSub + Dummy_Utilities +     Dummy_Telecoms + 
Dummy_RealEst + Dummy_Health + Dummy_Indust +     Dummy_Oil + 
Dummy_Retail + Dummy_Const + Dummy_Pers + Dummy_Trav 
chisq = 743.47, df = 36, p-value < 2.2e-16 
alternative hypothesis: cross-sectional dependence 
 
Pesaran CD test for cross-sectional dependence in panels 
 
data:  log(Delta_CoVaR) ~ Beta + log(VaR) + log(Leverage) + log(Size) +     Inno + 
Dummy_FornCon + Dummy_FornSub + Dummy_Utilities +     Dummy_Telecoms + 
Dummy_RealEst + Dummy_Health + Dummy_Indust +     Dummy_Oil + 
Dummy_Retail + Dummy_Const + Dummy_Pers + Dummy_Trav 
z = 27.096, p-value < 2.2e-16 
alternative hypothesis: cross-sectional dependence 
 
t test of coefficients: 
                   Estimate  Std. Error  t value  Pr(>|t|)     
Beta             1.0647e+00  1.2186e-01   8.7372 2.498e-16 *** 
log(VaR)         9.5015e-01  1.2348e-02  76.9452 < 2.2e-16 *** 
log(Leverage)   -1.3216e-01  1.8506e-02  -7.1417 8.434e-12 *** 
log(Size)        2.1254e-02  6.0485e-03   3.5138 0.0005171 *** 
Inno            -5.1240e-05  5.3163e-06  -9.6384 < 2.2e-16 *** 
Dummy_FornCon   -1.6388e-01  1.2953e-02 -12.6519 < 2.2e-16 *** 
Dummy_FornSub    4.6204e-01  3.2766e-02  14.1013 < 2.2e-16 *** 
Dummy_Utilities -3.0572e-01  9.7211e-03 -31.4492 < 2.2e-16 *** 
Dummy_Telecoms  -3.3845e-01  1.6670e-02 -20.3037 < 2.2e-16 *** 
Dummy_RealEst    3.6605e-02  3.9336e-02   0.9306 0.3529060     
Dummy_Health     7.7450e-02  3.3408e-02   2.3183 0.0211751 *   
Dummy_Indust    -4.7010e-01  1.4852e-02 -31.6511 < 2.2e-16 *** 
Dummy_Oil        9.5432e-03  1.2646e-02   0.7547 0.4511107     
Dummy_Retail    -1.9183e-01  2.8196e-02  -6.8036 6.483e-11 *** 
Dummy_Const     -6.2695e-01  4.0479e-02 -15.4883 < 2.2e-16 *** 
Dummy_Pers       2.7392e-02  2.2301e-02   1.2283 0.2203933     
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
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